Dili — The effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) does not simply fall into categories of success or failure. A study by Agustinus Santiago Eca Fernandes of Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa'e (UNTL), Dili, Timor-Leste, shows that the Council’s ability to reach decisions depends heavily on the nature of an issue and how strongly it affects the strategic interests of major powers. The study introduces the concept of “layered rationality” to explain why the UNSC can become deadlocked over highly political conflicts while still achieving cooperation on humanitarian, health, and technical issues.
The UNSC has a central role in addressing threats to international peace and security. However, its ability to act collectively varies across different situations. In some cases, the Council can adopt resolutions and coordinate international responses. In others, disagreements among permanent members, particularly those holding veto power, can prevent collective action.
Fernandes brings together two major perspectives in international relations: neorealism and neoliberalism. Neorealism emphasizes power, security, national interests, and the strategic position of states. Neoliberalism, meanwhile, highlights the ability of international institutions to establish rules, facilitate cooperation, provide information, and coordinate action despite competition among states.
The study argues that these two perspectives do not necessarily have to be treated as competing explanations. Instead, states may rely on different forms of reasoning depending on how sensitive an issue is to their interests. When an issue involves national security, sovereignty, military intervention, territorial disputes, or major-power interests, neorealist logic tends to become stronger. When an issue concerns humanitarian assistance, health, monitoring, or technical coordination, there is greater room for neoliberal cooperation.
Fernandes uses a qualitative comparative approach and process tracing to examine four cases: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Syrian conflict from 2011 to 2014, the Ukraine crisis from 2014 to 2022, and the UNSC response to the Ebola outbreak in 2014 as a negative case.
The Kuwait case demonstrates a situation in which the UNSC was able to act effectively. After Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the Council adopted Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding Iraq’s withdrawal. It later adopted Resolution 661, which imposed economic sanctions, followed by Resolution 678, which authorized the use of “all necessary means” after diplomatic and sanctions-based efforts failed.
According to the study, the Council’s effectiveness in the Kuwait case was supported by relatively aligned strategic interests among major powers. None of the permanent members used its veto to block the relevant decisions, allowing collective action through the UNSC to proceed.
The situation was different in Syria. In 2011 and 2012, draft resolutions addressing violence and potential sanctions failed after Russia and China exercised their vetoes. Issues involving intervention and the future of the Syrian government were closely connected to strategic interests, strengthening the role of neorealist calculations.
Political deadlock, however, did not prevent every form of cooperation. In 2014, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2139 on humanitarian access, with a 15-0-0 vote. Resolution 2165 subsequently established a framework for cross-border humanitarian assistance and monitoring. The case demonstrates that cooperation remained possible in humanitarian areas even when major powers disagreed sharply over the broader political conflict.
A similar pattern appeared in the Ukraine case. When Russia became directly involved in the conflict and used its veto power, the UNSC was unable to produce coercive action against the annexation of Crimea. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, another draft resolution condemning the aggression failed because of Russia’s veto.
The deadlock encouraged member states to use alternative mechanisms outside the UNSC. The UN General Assembly invoked the Uniting for Peace mechanism, and on March 2, 2022, a resolution concerning Russia’s aggression was supported by 141 countries. The case demonstrates how international cooperation can shift to another UN forum when veto politics prevent the Security Council from reaching a collective decision.
The Ebola case presents a contrasting example. When the Ebola outbreak in West Africa developed into a cross-border health emergency, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2177 on September 18, 2014. The resolution supported international coordination and helped strengthen the global response, including the establishment of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, or UNMEER.
From these cases, Fernandes develops three layers of rationality. The vital layer involves military intervention, territorial issues, regional security, and major-power strategic interests. Neorealist logic is strongest at this level. The normative layer lies between strategic interests and considerations involving law, reputation, and moral pressure. The technical layer covers humanitarian assistance, healthcare, monitoring, administration, and coordination, where neoliberal cooperation tends to have greater room to operate.
This framework suggests that the effectiveness of the UNSC should not be judged simply as either effective or ineffective. The Council may fail to produce coercive action in a major conflict while still succeeding in facilitating humanitarian assistance, monitoring mechanisms, or technical cooperation.
Fernandes argues that this distinction is important for policymakers and UN practitioners. When political negotiations become blocked by strategic interests, humanitarian and technical cooperation should still be preserved. Separating areas where practical agreement is possible from highly sensitive political questions could help the UNSC maintain part of its institutional function even during periods of major disagreement.
The study also highlights the importance of alternative UN mechanisms when veto politics prevent the Security Council from reaching agreement. The General Assembly can provide another institutional channel for collective international responses when action through the UNSC becomes blocked.
Overall, Fernandes concludes that the effectiveness of the UNSC is contextual and layered. Neorealism provides a stronger explanation for veto use and political deadlock when sovereignty, intervention, territory, and major-power security interests are at stake. Neoliberalism, meanwhile, better explains continued cooperation in humanitarian, health, monitoring, and technical areas.
The concept of layered rationality therefore offers a more flexible way to understand how the UNSC operates. States do not necessarily have to choose between power politics and institutional cooperation. Instead, they can apply different forms of reasoning simultaneously, depending on how strongly a particular issue affects their vital interests.
Author
Agustinus Santiago Eca Fernandes — Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa'e (UNTL), Dili, Timor-Leste.
Research Source
“Layered Rationality in the United Nations Security Council: Bridging Neorealism and Neoliberalism through Process Tracing,” East Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Research (EAJMR), Vol. 5, No. 8, 2026, pp. 3315–3332.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.55927/eajmr.v5i8.262
Journal: https://journaleajmr.my.id/index.php/eajmr
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