The researchers argue that the rapid spread of misleading information through digital platforms can affect public trust, political and social stability, and the wider information environment. Their analysis is particularly relevant as Indonesia continues to experience rapid internet adoption and growing dependence on social media for news and public communication.
Disinformation Is Becoming a Broader Security Issue
Social media allows information to spread quickly, cheaply, and across national borders. The same characteristics that make digital platforms useful for communication can also make them vulnerable to organized manipulation.
The study cites the World Economic Forum's Global Risks Report 2025, which identified misinformation and disinformation as the leading global risk over the following two years. A Pew Research Center survey covering 25 countries also found that a median of 72 percent of respondents considered online false or misleading information a major threat. In Indonesia, the figure reached 70 percent.
Indonesia's large online population increases the importance of the issue. Data cited in the article from the Association of Indonesian Internet Service Providers (APJII) recorded 221.56 million internet users, representing 79.5 percent internet penetration.
The Indonesian Anti-Defamation Society (MAFINDO) recorded 2,119 hoax findings during the first half of 2024, compared with 1,185 during the same period in 2023. Of the 2024 findings, 1,037 cases, or 48.9 percent, were related to political content.
How the Researchers Examined Disinformation Governance
Aritonang, Almubaraq, and Tarigan used a descriptive qualitative approach based on secondary data. Their sources included academic publications, government information, institutional reports, data from Indonesia's Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs (Komdigi), MAFINDO findings, government policies, and information from digital platforms.
The researchers analyzed the different forms and impacts of disinformation and examined how Indonesia manages the problem. They also compared Indonesia's approach with governance practices in Singapore, Taiwan, and the European Union.
The comparison focused on several elements, including early detection, fact-checking, public communication, digital literacy, platform governance, and cooperation between government and other stakeholders.
Indonesia Already Has Multiple Anti-Disinformation Measures
The study identifies several mechanisms already operating in Indonesia.
Komdigi's Artificial Intelligence System (AIS) Team monitors digital content and identifies information considered misleading or false. The ministry identified and clarified 1,923 hoax contents throughout 2024. The study also reports 1,017 issues identified between January and August 2026.
Indonesia also provides a public reporting mechanism through AduanKonten, allowing people to report suspected problematic digital content.
Another major approach is digital literacy. The government's National Digital Literacy Movement and the Indonesia Makin Cakap Digital program promote four main areas: digital skills, digital ethics, digital safety, and digital culture.
The study cites the 2024 Indonesia Digital Society Index (IMDI), which recorded a national score of 43.34. The digital skills sub-index reached 58.25, increasing from 56.59 in 2023.
Research cited by the authors also indicates that digital literacy can improve people's ability to recognize and respond to disinformation. A 2024 cluster-randomized study involving 325 students in nine classes across three areas of Central Java found positive effects from digital literacy and fact-checking interventions.
Platform Governance Remains a Major Challenge
According to Aritonang, Almubaraq, and Tarigan, Indonesia's existing response still faces an important challenge: digital platform governance.
Indonesia's regulatory framework requires electronic system providers to moderate illegal content and adjust their systems when necessary. However, the researchers point to continuing gaps involving algorithmic transparency, recommendation systems, echo chambers, content amplification, moderation, and systemic detection.
The study also cites data from the 2024 election period showing substantial amounts of identified disinformation across major platforms, including Facebook, X, TikTok, Instagram, SnackVideo, and YouTube.
The researchers argue that addressing individual pieces of false content is not sufficient when the wider digital ecosystem can influence what users see, share, and engage with.
Lessons From Singapore, Taiwan, and the European Union
The comparative analysis highlights different approaches to managing disinformation.
Singapore uses the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA), which provides a government-led framework for issuing correction directions and responding to online falsehoods. Its S.U.R.E. initiative also promotes information and media literacy.
The European Union combines platform regulation, transparency requirements, fact-checking, political advertising measures, user empowerment, researcher access to data, and assessment of systemic risks under its broader digital governance framework.
Taiwan places greater emphasis on societal resilience and cooperation among government institutions, media organizations, fact-checkers, civil society groups, and civic-technology communities.
Despite institutional differences, the cases share several elements: early detection, verification, rapid public communication, digital literacy, and cross-sector cooperation.
Why the Findings Matter
The study suggests that Indonesia's response to disinformation needs to move beyond simply detecting and removing individual pieces of false content.
Effective governance also requires greater attention to how platforms recommend, amplify, moderate, and distribute information. Government agencies, technology companies, journalists, researchers, fact-checkers, educators, and citizens all have roles in strengthening the information ecosystem.
Sintia Clara Aritonang, Hikmat Zakky Almubaraq, and Herlina Tarigan of Indonesia Defense University frame disinformation governance as part of non-military national security. Their analysis indicates that protecting the information environment involves not only content verification but also institutional trust, public communication, platform accountability, and societal resilience.
The researchers also acknowledge limitations. The study relies on secondary data and a descriptive qualitative approach, meaning it does not directly measure the effectiveness of every existing intervention. Its comparison with Singapore, Taiwan, and the European Union also involves systems with different institutional and regulatory conditions. The authors suggest that future research should incorporate primary data and empirical assessments, including deeper investigation of platform-level systems and algorithms.
Author Profiles
Sintia Clara Aritonang — Affiliated with Indonesia Defense University (Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia). The article does not state her academic degree or provide a detailed individual expertise profile.
Hikmat Zakky Almubaraq — Affiliated with Indonesia Defense University (Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia). The article does not specify his academic degree or detailed individual expertise.
Herlina Tarigan — Affiliated with Indonesia Defense University (Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia). The article does not specify her academic degree or detailed individual expertise.
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